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Decarceration and Default Mental States
Benjamin Levin*
INTRODUCTION
On June 14, 2013, the House Judiciary Committee’s Overcriminalization
Task Force convened a hearing on “Defining the Problem and Scope of OverCriminalization and Over-Federalization.”1 The hearing featured testimony
from four witnesses: George J. Terwilliger, III, a white-collar defense
attorney and former U.S. Attorney and Acting Attorney General, William N.
Shepherd of the American Bar Association, John G. Malcolm of the Heritage
Foundation, and Steven D. Benjamin of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers.2
In introducing the hearing, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, the Task
Force Chairman, argued that “[t]he need for reform becomes particularly
apparent when you read the stories of well-meaning Americans whose lives
have been turned upside down when they run afoul of an obscure Federal
statute.”3 Sensenbrenner provided examples of such federal overreach:
In Virginia, a little girl saved a woodpecker from the family cat and
was fined $535 because under the Federal Migratory Bird Act it is
a crime to take or transport a woodpecker. In Texas, a 66-year-old
retiree had his home raided by a SWAT team and spent almost 2
years in prison because he didn’t have the proper paperwork for
some of his prized orchids, all of which were legally imported.4

The testimony that followed included similar anecdotes and accounts of
absurd statutes or their absurd applications: racecar driver Bobby Unser who
was convicted of unlawful operation of a snowmobile within a national forest

* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. For helpful comments and
conversations, many thanks to Rachel Barkow, Doug Berman, Jenny Braun, Molly Gill, Aya
Gruber, David Jaros, Chenjerai Kumanyika, Joan Segal, Michael Serota, Ahmed White, Gideon
Yaffe, and the participants in “Guilty Minds: A Virtual Conference on Mens Rea and Criminal
Justice Reform” at ASU’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.
1. See Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and Over-Federalization:
Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Defining the Problem].
2. Id. at 7–49.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 2.
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wilderness area after getting lost during a snowstorm;5 John Yates, a
fisherman who was convicted of violating the Enron-era documentdestruction provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (a felony) for disposing of
undersized grouper to avoid citation.6 And, in recommending legislative
solutions, each witness endorsed mens rea reform.7 To prevent undeserving
people from being convicted and punished, the witnesses argued, prosecutors
should be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
intentionally or knowingly acted unlawfully, even if the statute was silent as
to the mental state necessary for the offense.8
The June 2013 hearing provides a window into mens rea reform, its
appeal, and also its limitations. In the literature on overcriminalization and
mens rea reform, similar cases and statutes are frequently identified as
illustrations of criminal law run amok.9 (The prospect of a felony prosecution
for the unauthorized use of the Forest Service mascot, Woodsy Owl, is a
favorite example.10) But it strikes me as misguided to suggest that these cases
and the unknowing commission of federal crimes lie at the heart of the
carceral state and the flawed institutions of the U.S. criminal system.11 The
5. Id. at 4–5.
6. Id. at 21–22. See generally Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
7. See Defining the Problem, supra note 1, at 65–66.
8. See generally id. Mens rea reform proposals generally include two components: a
default mental state requirement, and a requirement that defendants know that they are acting
unlawfully. See, e.g., Criminal Code Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 4002, 114th Congress
(2015).
9. See, e.g., MIKE CHASE, HOW TO BECOME A FEDERAL CRIMINAL: A N ILLUSTRATED
HANDBOOK FOR THE ASPIRING O FFENDER (2019); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION : THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 35 (2008); Benjamin Levin, Mens
Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 520–21 (2019); Erik
Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2005); John G.
Malcolm, Criminal Justice Reform at the Crossroads, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 249, 279–80
(2016); Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes
as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 652 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 760 n.65 (2005); Luna, supra note
9, at 704; O’Sullivan, supra note 9, at 652; Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s
Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
583, 589–90 (2005); Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law”, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585,
1606 n.118 (2012); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 517 (2001).
11. See RACHEL E LISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
MASS INCARCERATION 17 (2019) (critiquing the focus on “anecdotes about particularly
egregious cases” in conversations about reform). I use “criminal system” or “criminal legal
system” in this Essay advisedly, as scholars increasingly stress that the administration of criminal
law in the United States rests on a range of local actors, politics, and institutions that are not
unified by a coherent theory or overarching set of principles. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
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federal system accounts for only ten percent of the people incarcerated, and
roughly forty percent of people incarcerated nationwide are being held for
crimes classified as violent.12 With an unprecedentedly large number of
people held in cages, with dramatic enforcement disparities across race and
class, and with an ever-expanding criminal system, it’s hard to believe that
the big fix is to require prosecutors to prove knowledge or intent so that “wellmeaning Americans” aren’t convicted.13
To be clear, though, that doesn’t mean mens rea reform is objectionable
from a policy perspective or that it wouldn’t advance the interests of justice.
The criminal system has many flaws, and just because a given policy solution
isn’t responsive to the greatest evils certainly doesn’t make it unworthy.14
Similarly, that a given policy might not target the most vulnerable defendants
or might advance a policy agenda beyond or apart from reducing the prison
population (here, de-regulation), shouldn’t be fatal strikes against it. Indeed,
I have critiqued at length opposition to mens rea reform from progressives
committed to facilitating white-collar prosecutions.15
In this Essay, I offer a critical account of the debates over mens rea reform.
I argue that the current terms of the debate represent (from both supporters
and opponents) an overly narrow vision of criminal justice reform.
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 461 (1993); DAVID GARLAND, P ECULIAR
INSTITUTION : AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 25–27 (2010); PHILIP
GOODMAN, JOSHUA P AGE & MICHELLE P HELPS, BREAKING THE P ENDULUM: THE L ONG
STRUGGLE OVER CRIMINAL J USTICE 7 (2017); Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander
Nabavi-Noori, Toward a Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473, 1475 n.7 (2020);
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and CostBenefit Analysis, 47 J. LEGAL S TUD. 419, 421 (2018); Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils
of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 558 (2016) (“The criminal justice
system lags behind most other government agencies when it comes to data tracking, for a very
simple reason: the ‘system’ is not a system at all. Instead, it is a loose affiliation among
independent law enforcement agencies, individual counties, local jails, and state prisons.”);
Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of “Criminal Justice”, 15 OHIO S T. J. CRIM. L. 619,
619–20 (2018); Sara Mayeux, The Idea of “The Criminal Justice System”, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L.
55, 65 (2018); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison
Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2013).
12. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html
[https://perma.cc/3N8R-HZYX].
13. But see Michael Serota, Strict Liability Abolition (July 27, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that a shift away from strict liability is a key component
of combatting the distributional inequities of mass incarceration).
14. See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 229 (2017) (arguing that mass incarceration resulted from “a series of small decisions,
made over time, by a disparate group of actors” and so “mass incarceration will have to be undone
the same way”).
15. See generally Levin, supra note 9.
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Elsewhere, I have described two competing impulses, strands, or frames in
scholarship and advocacy on U.S. criminal policy: over critiques and mass
critiques.16 The over frame suggests that “[t]here is an optimal rate of
incarceration and an optimal rate of criminalization, but the current criminal
system is sub- (or, perhaps extra-) optimal in that it has criminalized too much
and incarcerated too many;”17 in contrast, the mass frame rejects the focus on
miscalibration and suggests “that criminal law is doing ill by marginalizing
populations and exacerbating troubling power dynamics and distributional
inequities. Every incarcerated person might have been guilty of the charged
offense, and the critique would still hold.”18
Common arguments for and against mens rea reform reflect an over
approach: much disagreement seems to rest on the question of whether the
class of defendants who might benefit from such reforms are deserving or
undeserving of such lenience.19 Proponents argue that these reforms would
shield those undeserving of punishment, while opponents argue that reforms
would shield those deserving of punishment. Mass-style critiques and
accounts, though increasingly ubiquitous in the academy and in activist and
advocacy circles,20 are conspicuously absent from the mens rea discourse,
inviting the impression that mens rea reform shouldn’t matter to mass
critics.21
Ultimately, therefore, I offer a different frame for mens rea reform and for
understanding the stakes of the debate that might resonate with mass
critiques. I suggest that mens rea reform can be analogized to the rule of lenity
16. See generally Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117
MICH. L. REV. 259 (2018).
17. Id. at 262–63.
18. Id. at 263 (footnote omitted).
19. See infra Parts I & II.
20. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT
AND THE M YTH OF N ATURAL O RDER (2011); Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination
of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2018); Ruairí Arrieta-Kenna, The Deep Roots—and New
(June
12,
2020),
Offshoots—of
‘Abolish
the
Police’,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/12/abolish-defund-police-explainer-316185
[https://perma.cc/ZXS6-WGFC]; Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To:
The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L. J. 1419 (2016); Introduction, Developments
in the Law–Prison Abolition, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1568 (2019) (describing the increasing interest
in abolitionist approaches); Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police,
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floydabolish-defund-police.html [https://perma.cc/YZY2-UXS9]; Edward Ongweso Jr., ‘Defund the
(June
9,
2020),
Police’
Actually
Means
Defunding
the
Police,
VICE
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ep4xy7/what-does-defund-and-abolish-the-police-mean
[https://perma.cc/R5NA-7ASA]; Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition As Praxis of Human Being: A
Foreword, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (2019).
21. See Levin, supra note 9, at 519–23.

53:747] DECARCERATION AND DEFAULT MENTAL STATES

751

and the libertarian, liberal, or anti-statist aspects of the Bill of Rights—these
rules are not solely focused on sorting the guilty and the innocence; rather, I
suggest, they can be viewed as “anti-criminalization” rules,22 directives to put
a thumb on the scale in favor of defendants and against the state, state
violence, and criminal punishment.23 Framed in this way, I argue that mens
rea reform should be appealing to commentators concerned about mass
incarceration, state violence, and the sweeping reach of criminal law and its
enforcement. Perhaps more provocatively, I also argue that mens rea reform
could be understood as consistent with more radical calls for abolition or
dismantling of the carceral state.
My argument unfolds in three parts. In Part I, I describe the conventional
case for mens rea reform and critique its focus on individual responsibility
and moral culpability. I address the ways in which this frame erases or
understates inequality and social context. Additionally, I argue that this frame
appears to reflect a narrow conception of what’s wrong with the criminal
system that might continue to allow for a massive carceral state and in doing
so might exacerbate distributional inequality. In Part II, though, I critique the
conventional case against mens rea reform. Focusing on progressives who
view proposed legislation as a shield for greedy and irresponsible whitecollar defendants, I argue that the reliance on criminal law as a regulatory
tool is flawed. Similarly, I suggest that the willingness to carve-out a specific
class of defendant and allow for sloppy legislating and haphazard prosecution
reflects a vision of criminal justice reform that is also troublingly narrow.
Finally in Part III, I offer an alternative frame for mens rea reform, suggesting
that these efforts can and should be embraced by commentators with a more
radical, anti-carceral approach. That the bills might benefit wealthier
defendants doesn’t mean that such bills—or other efforts to restrict state
prosecutorial power—should be rejected by anti-carceral commentators or
“criminal law skeptics;”24 instead, I argue that recognizing the anti-statist
dimensions of default mental state requirements should suggest that they

22. Cf. Máximo Langer, Response, Penal Abolitionism and Criminal Law Minimalism:
Here and There, Now and Then, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 73–74 (2020) (describing “the ultima
ratio principle [that] would still require that the criminal law statute not be passed, and not be
enforced once passed, if noncriminal responses or measures were sufficient to adequately advance
a legitimate goal such as addressing harmful behavior”); Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as
Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. L EGAL STUD. 207, 214 (2004).
23. Cf. Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 D UKE L.J.
263 (2005) (making a similar argument regarding the proportionality principle).
24. See generally Douglas Husak, The Price of Criminal Law Skepticism: Ten Functions of
the Criminal Law, 23 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 27 (2020) (describing and critiquing the rise of
“criminal law skepticism”).
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belong in a broader pantheon of pro-defendant doctrines that help provide
some check on society’s punitive impulses.
I.

THE LIMITS OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

Like much of the literature on overcriminalization, arguments for mens
rea reform tend to sound in a decidedly over register—they foreground the
blamelessness of the defendant or the lack of seriousness of the conduct.
Perhaps the defendant who unknowingly breaks a law is morally blameless
and therefore is undeserving of punishment. Or perhaps punishing individuals
who don’t know they are breaking the law will do little to deter future
lawbreaking. Without wading into the vast scholarly literature on strict
liability and the importance of mens rea, it is sufficient to recognize that
“[t]he vision of punishing a hapless, choiceless defendant is perhaps the most
powerful buttress of the argument against strict liability.”25 And such a vision
underpins the Model Penal Code’s adoption of a default mental state
(recklessness) when statutes are silent.26 As Kenneth Simons has argued, this
default “is important as a matter of principle.”27 Demanding that the state
prove some heightened state of awareness “expresses the classic liberal idea
that moral culpability is, and criminal liability should be, based on a
conscious choice to do wrong.”28
25. Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME &
JUSTICE 1512 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); see also Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict
Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1075–76 (1997) (“Strict liability
appears to be a straightforward case of punishing the blameless, an approach that might have
consequential benefits but is unfair on any retrospective theory of just deserts.”). Of course, there
remain significant questions about how to assess knowledge and ignorance and just how great an
emphasis either should play in determining criminal culpability. Compare D OUGLAS H USAK,
IGNORANCE OF LAW: A P HILOSOPHICAL I NQUIRY (2016), with Gideon Yaffe, Is Akrasia
Necessary for Culpability? On Douglas Husak’s Ignorance of Law, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 341
(2018).
26. See, e.g., Luis E. Chiesa, Mens Rea in Comparative Perspective, 102 MARQ . L. REV.
575, 581 (2018) (describing the default mental state of recklessness as “defin[ing] the limits
between advertent and inadvertent wrongdoing.”); Stuntz, supra note 10, at 583 n.276 (“By most
accounts, the single most important rule in the MPC is the establishment of recklessness . . . as
the default mens rea . . . .”); Kimberly Thomas, Reckless Juveniles, 52 U.C. D AVIS L. REV. 1665,
1688 n.96 (2019) (“[M]any would suggest that criminal liability not extend (or rarely extend) to
those who do not choose to do wrong.”)
27. Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be
Amended?, 1 O HIO S T. J. CRIM. L. 179, 188 (2003).
28. Id.; cf. R.A. Duff, Perversions & Subversions of Criminal Law, in THE BOUNDARIES
OF THE C RIMINAL L AW 88, 100 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010) (“The criminal law addresses us as
responsible agents: it reminds us what we have normally conclusive reason not to do, and
intervenes coercively only if we fail to act as those reasons require.”).
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This scholarly concern about people unwittingly breaking the law is
reflected in much of the advocacy for mens rea reform. The National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Heritage Foundation have
argued that the absence of mental state requirements coupled with otherwise
broad statutory language have “allow[ed] prosecutors to obtain convictions
of persons who are not truly blameworthy . . . .”29 Similarly, Representative
Bobby Scott has argued that “without [mens rea requirements] in our criminal
laws, honest citizens are at risk of being victimized and criminalized by
poorly crafted legislation and overzealous prosecutors.”30 And Senator Orrin
Hatch has argued that the Mens Rea Reform Act of 2017 would “ensure that
honest, hardworking Americans are not swept up in the criminal justice
system for doing things they didn’t know were against the law.”31
Put differently, proponents often suggest that mens rea reform would
operate as a means of re-sorting defendants—i.e., a world of broad statutes
without strong mental state requirements allows for the prosecution and
conviction of defendants who are less deserving of punishment, whereas a
world of heightened mental state requirements would refocus state violence
on defendants who should be held (criminally) responsible. In this way, the
arguments advanced by reform proponents appear to imply a punitive
corollary: defendants who do satisfy heightened mens rea requirements
deserve criminalization, prosecution, and punishment. The evil to be avoided
in many of these accounts is not so much criminalization and punishment as
such, but the criminalization and punishment of people who don’t believe that
they are breaking the law.
To the extent that the problem with the criminal system is that people
aren’t on sufficient notice of what conduct is criminal and/or are frequently
arrested, prosecuted, or punished for making mistakes, the individual
responsibility frame would do more work. But, as noted at the outset of the
Essay, that strikes me as a troublingly narrow critique of U.S. criminal legal
institutions.32 I don’t intend to offer a critique of the theoretical work that
29. BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND., WITHOUT INTENT:
HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 29
(2010) (emphasis added).
30. Mens Rea: The Need for a Meaningful Intent Requirement in Federal Criminal Law:
Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 3 (2013) (emphasis added).
31. Press Release, U.S. Senate, Senators Hatch, Lee, Cruz, Perdue, and Paul Introduce Bill
to
Strength
Criminal
Intent
Protections
(Oct.
2,
2017),
https://www.lee.senate.gov/2017/10/senators-hatch-lee-cruz-perdue-and-paul-introduce-bill-tostrength-criminal-intent-protections [https://perma.cc/X7T8-QGTA] (emphasis added).
32. To be clear, though, just because it is too narrow certainly doesn’t render those critiques
unfounded or un-compelling. That is, I agree that failure to provide notice and criminally
punishing people who unwittingly break the law are not desirable.
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undergirds many arguments in favor of imposing a default mental state. But
I do think it’s worth noting that some of these claims about personal
responsibility and notice are far from uncontroversial.
Scholars have critiqued these sorts of choice-based arguments as
reinforcing an inaccurate vision of society that understates inequality and
over-states freedom of choice.33 Further, while I disagree with progressive
arguments in favor of using criminal law to further ends associated with the
regulatory state,34 it would be a mistake to discount claims that foreground
harm as opposed to moral culpability. That is, the logic of mens rea reform
advocacy often appears to accept an uncritical embrace of criminal law to
address low-level but intentional wrongdoing (e.g., simple assault, theft, etc.)
while rejecting criminal law as the vehicle to respond to environmental
catastrophes or largescale workplace harms. I remain skeptical (at best) about
the use of criminal law to address harm caused by negligent actors, employers
unknowingly flouting regulations, etc. But it’s not at all clear to me that
punishment is less justified in those cases than it is in a host of cases where
defendants knowingly or intentionally break the law but cause much less
harm.
Accepting this language or frame of individual responsibility as the
justification for mens rea reform, then, risks embracing a logic under which
society should be concerned about protecting “marginal middle-class
misbehavior,”35 but should be free to criminalize the known lawbreaking of
the lower classes.
II.

THE LIMITS OF CARCERAL PROGRESSIVISM

The limitations of the mainstream case for mens rea reform should be
particularly evident for readers concerned about the distributive
consequences of criminal law. It is striking that the June 2013 hearing
33. See, e.g., Jody Armour, Nigga Theory: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in the
Substantive Criminal Law, 12 OHIO S T. J. CRIM. L. 9, 11 (2014); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility
and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV . L. REV. 959, 1003 (1992) (“Criminal law’s
preoccupation with rationality and free choice, no matter how compromised these concepts are in
theory and how diluted in practice, represents a remarkably narrow view of the constituents
through which individuals become the responsible authors of objects and events.”); Robert L.
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. S CI. Q. 470 (1923);
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retributivism, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973); Frances Olsen,
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497,
1566 (1983); cf. Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1333 (2006) (arguing that assessments of culpability are often affected by
assorted biases).
34. See generally infra Part II.A.
35. Stuntz, supra note 10, at 509.
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focused primarily on regulatory crime, that mens rea reform has been a
favorite cause of right-leaning politicians and advocates, and that some of
mens rea reform’s strong backers appear uninterested in reforms more clearly
targeted towards addressing disparate enforcement and the mine run of
criminal law’s administration. Put simply, it’s hard to disagree with
characterizations of mens rea reform as a darling of right-, conservative-, and
libertarian-leaning reformers focused on deregulation.36 But should these
reforms be opposed just because they might not target the deepest structural
flaws of the criminal system?37
The progressive case against mens rea reform tends to rely on a critique
of the reformers’ political goals and the ways in which proposed statutes
might shield rich, powerful defendants from prosecution, particularly in the
realms of environmental and financial crime.38 For example, Massachusetts
Senator Elizabeth Warren, a staunch opponent of mens rea reform, has argued
that such changes in the law would “make it much harder for the government
to prosecute hundreds of corporate crimes—everything from wire fraud to
mislabeling prescription drugs.”39 Illinois Senator Dick Durbin, has argued
36. Certainly, mens rea reform and default mental state provisions more generally enjoy
much greater support among academics, regardless of political or ideological commitments. See,
e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed To Fail: The President’s Deference to the
Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387,
422 (2017) (“[T]he mens rea reform provision had its own bipartisan support in the House, and
most criminal law scholars and professional bar associations have lamented for years that strict
liability laws have no place in the criminal sphere.”) (footnotes omitted); Darryl K. Brown,
Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & P OL’Y 657, 672
(2011) (“Scholars and others have widely endorsed a provision of this sort as a partial remedy for
federal criminal law.”). But, it’s worth noting that even such academic defenses often rest on a
similar discourse of personal responsibility and moral culpability.
37. I have discussed this question at length elsewhere. See Levin, supra note 9, at 517–27.
38. See, e.g., Mike Debonis, The Issue that Could Keep Congress from Passing Criminal
POST
(Jan.
20,
2016),
Justice
Reform,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/01/20/the-issue-that-could-keepcongress-from-passing-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/WUX9-LH93]; Deborah W.
Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 378 (2017) (collecting sources);
Editorial, Don’t Change the Legal Rule on Intent, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/opinion/sunday/dont-change-the-legal-rule-on-intent.html
[https://perma.cc/9XTE-ML87]; Levin, supra note 9, at 523–27 (collecting sources); Barack
Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811,
866 n. 89 (2017) (arguing that mens rea reform proposals could “undermine public safety and
harm progressive goals”); Alexander F. Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV.
97, 100 (2017) (collecting sources).
39. Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 125, 169 (2017); see also STAFF OF SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016
HOW W EAK ENFORCEMENT LETS CORPORATE O FFENDERS OFF EASY (2016),
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that proposed mens rea reform legislation “should be called the White Collar
Criminal Immunity Act.”40 And activists associated with Occupy Wall Street
similarly have contended that efforts to impose heightened default mental
states were nothing but “A ‘Get Out of Jail Free’ Card for White Collar
Criminals.”41
In this Section, I identify two concerns about this progressive position: (1)
that it reflects a problematic elision of regulation and criminal punishment;
and (2) that it reflects a troubling move to accept flawed institutional
dynamics when presented with a particularly pressing problem or a
particularly unsympathetic class of defendants.
A. Carceral Progressivism
Underlying many criticisms of mens rea reform remains a concern that the
state regularly fails to discipline capital or to hold industry accountable. I
share that concern. But it requires a logical leap to conclude that the number
of criminal prosecutions in a sector or the average prison sentence for a
corporate executive is the right way to gauge accountability or regulatory
success.42 While criminal prosecution and carceral sentences often may
function in popular discourse as metrics of “justice” or “accountability,” that
equation isn’t natural, inevitable, or necessary. And rejecting that equation or
the elision between those concepts has become a hallmark of left, anticarceral activism and scholarship.43
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BAW7-C3TB].
40. Matt Ford, Could a Controversial Bill Sink Criminal-Justice Reform in Congress?,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/will-congressreform-criminal-intent/544014/ [https://perma.cc/5ESB-3YFA].
41. Join Occupy the SEC in Urging the Congress To Oppose H.R.A 4002, PETITION
2CONGRESS, https://www.petition2congress.com/ctas/join-occupy-sec-in-urging-congress-tooppose-hr4002-criminal-code [https://perma.cc/V23H-KXWS].
42. On the question of the relative advantages and disadvantages of criminal and noncriminal regulatory approaches, see, for example, Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92
B.U. L. REV. 577, 581 (2012); Husak, supra note 24; Victor Tadros, Criminalization and
Regulation, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 163–90 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010).
43. See, e.g., AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME: T HE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF
WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN M ASS INCARCERATION (2020); JUSTIN M ARCEAU, BEYOND CAGES:
ANIMAL L AW AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT (2019); DANIELLE S ERED, U NTIL W E RECKON :
VIOLENCE, M ASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO REPAIR (2019); Community Accountability
Working Document, INCITE! (Mar. 5, 2003), https://incite-national.org/communityaccountability-working-document/ [https://perma.cc/8NN5-6796]; Mariame Kaba & Andrea J.
Ritchie, We Want More Justice for Breonna Taylor than the System that Killed Her Can Deliver,
ESSENCE (July 16, 2020), https://www.essence.com/feature/breonna-taylor-justice-abolition/
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By embracing this rhetorical slippage, progressive opponents of mens rea
reform reveal a limited conception of criminal justice reform, or perhaps
more accurately, reveal their limited interest in dialing back criminal legal
institutions. Just as the commentators discussed in Part I demonstrate a faith
in criminal institutions when directed at the right defendants, these
progressive lawmakers and commentators appear to retain faith and reliance
in criminal law as a desired regulatory vehicle. Perhaps that turn to criminal
law is simply pragmatic—a reflection of interest convergence and an
acceptance of the challenges of regulating using non-criminal channels.44 Or
perhaps the turn to criminal law reflects an earnest belief that criminal law
reflects a necessary moral judgment about powerful actors’ misconduct and
does important work both in deterring that conduct and sending a message
about shared community values.45 Either way (or even if the line between
principle and pragmatism isn’t always clear), the reliance on criminal law as
regulatory tool should be troubling to anyone concerned about the carceral
state and its metastasization.
Certainly, regulatory crime has not been the driver of prison populations
and is not the precipitator of most police violence or the explanatory force
behind widespread race- and class-based disparities in the criminal system.
But embracing the logic of accountability=criminal punishment means
accepting the baseline rationale that has facilitated mass incarceration.
Turning to criminal law here not only risks crowding out non-criminal and
non-carceral approaches to addressing environmental or financial regulation;
it also makes it much more difficult to argue for non-criminal (or, at least,
non-carceral) responses to a host of other social problems.
B. Sloppy Drafting and Prosecutorial Discretion
A certain amount of the debate about mens rea reform reflects a different,
but similarly frustrating elision: the one between imposing a default mental
state requirement and eliminating strict liability. The progressive arguments
highlighted above are accurately read as arguments in favor of strict

[https://perma.cc/Z34R-E9CW]; Benjamin Levin, Wage Theft Criminalization, 54 U.C. D AVIS
L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2021); Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 997, 997
(2021); Katie Way, Can’t Imagine a World Without Police? Start Here, V ICE (June 25, 2020),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/9353ky/what-is-transformative-justice-police-abolition
[https://perma.cc/38SW-2LVF] (collecting sources).
44. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the
Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1337, 1365 (2018).
45. See, e.g., GRUBER, supra note 43; Levin, supra note 43.
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liability,46 or perhaps other mental state requirements below the knowledge
or intent threshold.47 Criminal law scholars have debated the desirability of
strict liability, negligence standards, and other lower mental state
requirements at great length.48 And it may well be that proponents of mens
rea reform also would oppose the criminalization of conduct that lacked a
heightened mental state requirement. Yet no federal mens rea reform bill I
have seen precludes the imposition of criminal strict liability; the proposals
simply require that legislators specify that they want silence to be read as
signaling strict liability.49
Certainly, such proposals might create legislative headaches, forcing
lawmakers to revisit a host of criminal statutes to determine if they meant to
(or now want to) impose strict liability. And revisiting those statutes might
reopen debate and upset the tenuous political compromise that had allowed
for the bills’ passage in the first place.50 But (efficiency concerns aside), why
is that such a bad thing?
46. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
47. For example, Senator Warren has introduced legislation that would impose criminal
penalties for negligent conduct in the financial sector. See Corporate Executive Accountability
Act, S. 1010, 116th Cong. (2019); cf. Carissa Byrne Hessick & Benjamin Levin, Elizabeth
Warren’s Proposal To Imprison More Corporate Executives Is a Bad Idea, SLATE (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/04/elizabeth-warren-corporate-fraud-prisonnegligence-mass-incarceration.html [https://perma.cc/H5MU-BK2D] (critiquing the criminal
negligence standard in such proposed legislation).
48. See, e.g., MARKUS DIRK D UBBER, T HE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 147–53 (2005); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 152 (1968) (describing the frequent argument that “strict liability is odious, and
appears as a sacrifice of a valued principle”); R.A. Duff, Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and
the Presumption of Innocence, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 125 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005);
Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense
Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 314 (2003); George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal
Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 280 (1998) (describing the relationship between theories of
strict liability in tort and criminal law); Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1534 (2018); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the
Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith
Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1993) (“For years,
courts and commentators have struggled with the criminal strict liability doctrine.”); Stephen J.
Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 879, 879 (2000)
(“[V]irtually all criminal law theorists agree that moral fault is at least a necessary condition of
blame and punishment . . . .”); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 62 (1933); Simons, supra note 25, at 1075–76.
49. The same holds true for mental states that fall below the threshold of knowledge or
intent—i.e., legislators would need to specify negligence, recklessness, etc. as the required mental
state, rather than having a judge read it into otherwise silent or ambiguous statutory text.
50. And one certainly might conclude that upsetting this balance is a goal of some
reformers—mens rea reform would provide a second bite at the apple to defeat disfavored
criminal statutes.
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Decades of scholarship have critiqued expanding criminal codes and
legislators’ willingness to draft incredibly broad statutes at the behest of
prosecutors.51 Despite the incredibly high stakes of criminalizing conduct and
granting prosecutors and police significant discretion, lawmakers don’t have
a strong track record when it comes to drafting precise criminal statutes. To
be clear, as noted above, I don’t think that greater statutory clarity or precision
in drafting would remedy the evils and injustices of the carceral state. But
accepting the arguments advanced by progressive opponents of mens rea
reform would require us to accept that this deeply problematic approach to
lawmaking and law enforcement—i.e., criminalize broadly and trust
prosecutors and police to make the right enforcement calls—is acceptable, so
long as it facilitates (or potentially facilitates) punishing the right class of
defendants.52
If progressive lawmakers and advocates believe that the only way to
discipline capital or address industry misconduct is not only to criminalize,53
but to allow prosecutors to obtain convictions without proving defendants’
heightened mental states, then lawmakers should be forced to pass statutes
that expressly impose strict liability. I am not so naïve about the realities of
U.S. electoral politics that I believe it’s easy to pass legislation or adopt
policies that run counter to the interests of the wealthy or powerful. Yet, in a
nation grappling with its massive carceral footprint and the abuses of mass
criminalization, defending and legitimating the practice of legislative

51. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 9, at 34; Gregory M. Gilchrist, Regulation by Prosecutor,
56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315, 338 (2019); Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal
Clear Statement Rules, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 353 (2019) (“[I]n the case of overly broad
laws, no one expects the laws to be enforced as written. Instead, we rely on prosecutors to use
their discretion to weed out cases involving only trivial behavior.”); Shon Hopwood, Clarity in
Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM . L. REV. 695, 695–96 (2017); Kay L. Levine, The External
Evolution of Criminal Law, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2008); Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2136 (1998) (“Most legal
academics . . . would probably also agree that there are too many criminal statutes on the books,
and that those statutes are frequently too broad and too vague.”); Stuntz, supra note 10, at 510
(“[T]he story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and
legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes . . . .”).
52. Scholars frequently have critiqued the distributive consequences of broad criminal
statutes that facilitate discretionary enforcement. See, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting
Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173 (2017); Jamelia
Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999).
53. See generally Part II.A., supra.
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deference to prosecutors and law enforcement strikes me as a bad idea.54 Or,
perhaps more pointedly, embracing the institutions of tough-on-crime politics
legitimates tough-on-crime politics, even if the left/right valence appears
different or the imagined defendants are not society’s poorest or most
marginalized.
III.

MENS REA REFORM AS AN ANTI-CRIMINALIZATION RULE

As the two previous Parts illustrate, I find the current debate over mens
reform to be fairly limited. While proponents and opponents come from
different places and arrive at different places, they (at least theoretically or
rhetorically) appear to share a foundational assumption: reforming the U.S.
criminal system requires a re-sorting and recalibration.55 To the reform
proponents, criminal law, incarceration, and the institutions of the U.S.
criminal system are necessary for dealing with “real criminals,” but
overcriminalization, strict liability crimes, and sloppily drafted statutes cause
undeserving and “otherwise law-abiding” people to suffer. To reform
opponents, the criminal system might be flawed (see, e.g., the War on Drugs,
racial disparities, police violence, etc.), but that doesn’t mean it is illegitimate
or without important uses. The brutalities of the system’s treatment of
marginalized people don’t indicate an irredeemable system; rather,
prosecutors could right the balance by shifting their attention to the wealthy
and “white collar” offenders, and lawmakers and judges could grease the
wheels of these prosecutions by reducing the burden on prosecutors to prove
mens rea elements. Similarly, the problem with using criminal law as a
dominant regulatory paradigm is less that criminal law is the dominant
regulatory paradigm; rather it’s that these criminal regulatory approaches
must be better fine-tuned in their application.
Neither position, though, offers much to those who come to this debate
with a stronger-form opposition to criminalization, incarceration, or the
mechanisms of “governing through crime.”56 Maybe that gap or lack makes
54. I use “legitimation” in the Gramscian sense. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE
OF A DJUDICATION : F IN DE S IÈCLE (1997); ANTONIO GRAMSCI, S ELECTIONS FROM THE P RISON
NOTEBOOKS OF A NTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans.,
1971); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176,
2189 (2013); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 429–32
(1995).
55. Elsewhere I have described and critiqued this reformist frame. See Levin, supra note 16,
at 262–63.
56. See generally J ONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: H OW THE WAR ON
CRIME T RANSFORMED AMERICAN D EMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2009).
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sense from a political advocacy perspective—lawmakers might be wary of
appearing opposed to criminal law/criminalization, as opposed to appearing
concerned about criminalizing the “right” people or conduct. So proposing
reforms couched in the language of widespread decarceration or “criminal
law skepticism” might be a great recipe for failed advocacy. And, for scholars
and lawmakers who harbor some prosecutorial or punitive impulses, this
approach validates or make room for such impulses—this position or frame
still allows for deserving targets of state violence, just criminal statutes, and
well-directed prosecutions. But, as noted in the previous two Parts, these
arguments legitimate many problematic, flawed, and abusive aspects of the
carceral state. And, as noted at the outset of the Essay, they don’t speak to
increasingly common totalizing critiques of the U.S. criminal system.
Therefore, in this Part, I offer an alternative case for mens rea reform as an
anti-criminalization rule or norm.
In describing this rationale, I offer two different approaches: first, I
suggest that understanding mens rea reform as an anti-criminalization rule
resonates with a range of other substantive and procedural rules that might be
justified in civil libertarian, liberal,57 or anti-statist terms.58 Second, I suggest
that mens rea reform can be understood as a piece of a larger anticriminalization, decarceration, or abolitionist agenda that understands
criminalization, prosecution, and criminal punishment as evils to be avoided
if at all possible. Notably, in both Sections, I argue that these frames or
justifications do not require us to accept the logic that conduct accompanied
by a higher mens rea should be criminalized and that defendants acting with
a higher mens rea should be punished (or are more deserving of punishment
than defendants with lower mens rea). Instead, these frames suggest that
mens rea reform might operate as a potential check on state power and the
metastasization of the criminal system.
A. Anti-Statism
Fear of an arbitrary, authoritarian, or abusive state recurs in case law and
scholarship about the administration of criminal law. From the void-for57. As in rights-regarding.
58. Of course, there might be significant debate about what role the state should play in
exercising its non-criminal powers. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies
on the Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 23 LAW & PHIL. 437, 445 n.28 (2004) (noting
that libertarians “have the virtue of consistency on these topics”); Takei, supra note 39, at 172
(“For libertarians, the motivation to decarcerate stems from a general hostility to government
powers and large bureaucracies. In certain powerful respects, this intersects with the left's concern
about police and prosecutorial abuses of power. However, the libertarian critique is equally
suspicious of institutions like a social safety net . . . .”).
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vagueness doctrine to the rule of lenity and the right to a jury trial, it’s hard
not to discern a lurking uncertainty about unrestrained state violence, even in
the context of otherwise conservative opinions.59 As one leading criminal
procedure casebook puts it, many of the rights guaranteed by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments “are fundamentally to control government, rather than to
enhance accuracy or fairness.”60 I am hesitant about the prospect of seeking
radicalism in judicial opinions or constitutionalism.61 And it’s important to
stress that judges (despite announcing these anti-statist rationales) routinely
expand state power and restrict the rights of criminal defendants.62 But I do
think there’s reason to parse out a certain theoretical or rhetorical strand in
criminal law and procedure in part because of what it doesn’t say. Much
discussion of judicial interventions on behalf of criminal defendants focuses
on the risk of wrongful convictions. The so-called Blackstone Ratio, for
example, suggests that pro-defendant rules are justified even if they lead to
“the guilty going free”63 primarily because of the great evil of society
convicting and punishing an innocent defendant. But numerous doctrines that
favor defendants reveal a focus on protecting the guilty, or at the very least a
lack of emphasis on the guilt/innocence distinction.
The exclusionary rule and Fourth Amendment restrictions on
unreasonable searches and seizures don’t speak the language of reliability—
i.e., there’s no reason to think evidence seized in a warrantless search is
somehow less reliable than evidence seized pursuant to a warrant. Rather,

59. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 417 (1974); Cynthia Barmore, Authoritarian Pretext and the Fourth Amendment,
51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 311 (2016) (collecting sources); Roberts, supra note 52, at
775–77 (describing the role of vagueness in curbing aggressive, race-based policing).
60. JOSHUA DRESSLER & G EORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES ,
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 44 (6th ed. 2017).
61. As abolition and other more explicitly radical approaches to the criminal system have
begun to gain traction in the legal academy and public discourse, some scholars have sought to
reimagine the judiciary as a potential site for radicalism or at least to push on the tension between
constitutionalism and abolition/radicalism. E.g., Matthew Clair, Getting Judges on the Side of
Abolition, BOS. REV. (July 1, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/law-justice/matthew-clair-gettingjudges-side-abolition [https://perma.cc/BNL8-MMEF]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 105–22 (2019).
62. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169 (2008) (noting Founding Era concerns
about state power before ruling for the government on a Fourth Amendment claim).
63. Cf. Benjamin Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law: Of Public Perceptions and
Procedural Protections, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1777, 1780 (2013) (critiquing the “trope of the guilty
going free” as reflecting an inaccurate understanding of criminal law and criminal legal
institutions as natural and pre-political).
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these rights are justified in terms of a fear of state power run amok.64 Bars on
forcing a defendant to testify against herself and the conferral of many juryrelated rights similarly are couched (at least in some contexts) in terms of
preventing arbitrary enforcement and limiting state power.65 Similarly, judges
deploying the rule of lenity and the void-for-vagueness doctrine generally
nod to concerns about arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.66
An anti-statist frame might share some similarities with the conventional
case for mens rea reform, in part because of its resonance with many
liberal/libertarian arguments described in Part I.67 But the anti-statist frame
or justification that I suggest here is distinct from most of those arguments,
because it rejects a focus on the defendant and her culpability (or lack thereof)
and focuses exclusively on the state and the prosecutorial burden. Defendants
could be unquestionably factually guilty and that wouldn’t diminish the logic
of these anti-statist rules.68
My suggestion, then, is that we could understand mens rea reform as an
anti-criminalization rule,69 rooted in the same rationales commonly invoked
in the context of constitutional criminal procedure and of interpreting

64. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic purpose of this
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth
Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which ‘is basic to a free
society.’” (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949))).
65. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–43 (1966); Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H.
193, 195 (1882); Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87
IOWA L. REV. 145, 161 (2001) (“In a series of well-publicized cases before the Revolution, the
jury was hailed as a fundamental check on the abuses of the Crown.”).
66. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); cf. Guyora Binder & Brenner Fissell, A Political
Interpretation of Vagueness Doctrine, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (characterizing the voidfor-vagueness doctrine as vehicle for restricting the scope of criminal law).
67. Cf. Ian Haney López, Freedom, Mass Incarceration, and Racism in the Age of Obama,
62 ALA. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (2011) (describing contemporary, right-leaning libertarianism as
distinct from “your typical 19th century libertarianism deeply concerned with the coercive power
of the government, especially as wielded through the criminal apparatus (think of the values that
animate the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments—four out of the ten amendments
constituting our Bill of Rights aim to protect individuals from government overreaching in the
criminal law area)”).
68. Of course, harmless-error review, widespread judicial deference to law enforcement,
and a host of questionable doctrines tend to de-fang these rules. But that doesn’t mean that these
rules (at least nominally) speak to a deeper concern about the marginal or powerless defendant
subjected to state violence.
69. Cf. Ristroph, supra note 23 (making a similar argument regarding the proportionality
principle).
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criminal statutes.70 If framed in this way, a default mental state speaks less to
who should be punished than it does to the need to impose a higher bar on the
prosecution.71
B. Abolition
In the last few years, the language of abolition has attracted greater public
attention, with calls to abolish prisons, ICE, and other manifestations of the
carceral state creeping into the mainstream.72 And, as Doug Husak has
argued, “criminal skepticism” appears to be on the rise in academic circles,
with more scholars expressing “doubt that the criminal law as it is constituted
at present should continue to survive at all.”73
Mens rea reform hardly has been a cause embraced by abolitionist
activists, nor is its scholarly treatment framed in abolitionist terms. For a
range of pragmatic reasons, that makes sense to me: time, resources, and
political capital are limited, and to the extent that mens rea reform really is a
piece of a right-leaning deregulatory agenda that would affect few criminal
defendants, it should not come as a surprise that radical left activists wouldn’t
embrace it. Nevertheless, in this Section I suggest that mens rea reform can
be seen as consistent with broader abolitionist or anti-carceral commitments.
Most contemporary U.S. abolitionist claims are explicitly grounded in
distributive concerns:74 criminal law, policing, and punishment are
70. While this frame suggests a stronger normative anti-criminalization and antipunishment frame, it is consistent with Carissa Byrne Hessick and Joseph Kennedy’s call for
“criminal clear statement rules.” See generally Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 51.
71. The analysis in this Section and the Section that follows might also be consistent with
certain theories or positions associated with “criminal law minimalism.” See Langer, supra note
22, at 11–12 (collecting sources).
72. See, e.g., Kim Kelly, Opinion, What the Prison-Abolition Movement Wants, TEEN
VOGUE (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-is-prison-abolition-movement
[https://perma.cc/XVG4-VV3Q]; Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore
TIMES
(Apr.
17,
2019),
Might
Change
Your
Mind,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html
[https://perma.cc/4XVT-B6R2]; José Martín, Six Ideas for a Cop-Free World, ROLLING STONE
(Jun. 2, 2020), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/police-brutality-cop-freeworld-protest-199465/ [https://perma.cc/ZN58-SGZJ].
73. Husak, supra note 24, at 30.
74. Non-U.S. abolitionist accounts less steeped in the specific inequities of U.S. political
economy and racial capitalism do not necessarily reflect a similar distributive frame. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM DE H AAN, THE P OLITICS OF REDRESS: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND PENAL ABOLITION
(1990); THOMAS MATHIESEN, THE P OLITICS OF ABOLITION REVISITED (2015); Langer, supra
note 22, at 5–8. But, for present purposes, those accounts (grounded perhaps in humanism,
religious commitments, or other less race- or class-based concerns) sound less like what has
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objectionable largely because they operate to marginalize already
marginalized populations across a range of axes (class, race, sexuality, etc.).75
As a result, the case for abolition and abolitionist arguments tends to get
trickier when the distributive stakes shift and the targets of state violence are
also targets of abolitionist critique: For example, if abolitionism is opposed
to police, then why should abolitionist arguments shield violent police from
criminalization, prosecution, and punishment?76 If abolitionism is anti-racist
and opposed to bigotry, then why should abolitionist arguments shield
(violent) racists and bigots from criminalization, prosecution, and
punishment?77 If abolitionism is anti-capitalist, then why should abolitionist
arguments shield exploitative capitalists and abusive bosses from
criminalization, prosecution, and punishment?78
At first blush, a cause (mens rea reform) often associated with regulatory
crime and helping industry and “otherwise law-abiding people,” might seem
a non-obvious fit for an abolitionist approach. But I think mens rea reform
could (and should) be justified on abolitionist terms for three primary
reasons; the first is fairly straightforward and requires little discussion, while
the latter two are worth unpacking.
First, following from the anti-statist case articulated in the previous
Section, mens rea reform should make it harder for the state to criminalize,
convict, and punish. To the extent one adopts an “abolitionist ethic,”79 favors

become the increasingly dominant use of “abolition” or “abolitionism” in U.S. activist, advocacy,
and academic discourse. So given the topic of this Symposium and the focus on U.S. criminal
law, my discussion here focuses on the distributive abolitionist frame.
75. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 20; Patrisse Cullors, Abolition and Reparations: Histories
of Resistance, Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (2019);
Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1622 (2019);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1597, 1604–05 (2017); Roberts, supra note 52, at 7–8.
76. On this tension, see generally Levine, supra note 43; see also Elisabeth Epps, Amber
Guyger Should Not Go to Prison, THE APPEAL (Oct. 7, 2019), https://theappeal.org/amberguyger-botham-jean/ [https://perma.cc/T89P-L444]; McLeod, supra note 75, at 1640.
77. On this tension, see generally Morgan Bassichis, Alexander Lee & Dean Spade,
Building an Abolitionist Trans & Queer Movement with Everything We’ve Got, in CAPTIVE
GENDERS: TRANS EMBODIMENT AND THE P RISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 15 (Eric A. Stanley
& Nat Smith eds., 2011).
78. On this tension, see generally, Levin, supra note 43.
79. See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1156, 1161–62 (2015) (“By a ‘prison abolitionist ethic,’ I intend to invoke and build upon a moral
orientation elaborated in an existing body of abolitionist writings and nascent social movement
efforts, which are committed to ending the practice of confining people in cages and eliminating
the control of human beings through imminently threatened police use of violent force.”).
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decarceration, or simply has embraced “criminal law skepticism,”80 any move
that makes the prosecution’s task harder would appear to be a step in the right
direction.81 That is, even if mens rea reform wouldn’t help many defendants
and might not even reach the corners of the system or classes of defendants
most in need of assistance (or closest to the hearts of left commentators), it
still would throw a wrench into the machinery of criminal punishment. To
the extent that abolition suggests a commitment to decarceration and moving
away from using “criminalization and cages as catchall solutions to social
problems” for all,82 then rules that make it harder for the state to criminalize
or for prosecutors to succeed at trial should be seen as positives.83
Second, it’s not actually clear that the progressive critics of mens rea
reform are correct in their characterization of it as a project that would benefit
exclusively or primarily wealthier defendants charged with regulatory crimes
exclusively or predominantly.84 As Darryl Brown has argued, “in the context
of federal regulatory or white-collar crime prosecutions, federal courts have
a clear pattern of interpreting hundreds of criminal statutes to contain strict
mens rea requirements.”85 So it is possible that—despite libertarian and antiregulatory rhetoric—mens rea reform wouldn’t have a sweeping impact in
the “white-collar” realm, even if that were its desired effect. Instead (or in
addition), it may be that default mental state requirements would benefit a
range of other defendants charged with a very different class of crimes.
During a July 2014 hearing of the Congressional Over-Criminalization Task
Force, when asked about mens rea reform, federal defender David Patton
observed (over much laughter from Task Force and audience members) that
80. See Husak, supra note 24, at 29–30 (“[T]he thrust of criminal law skepticism is more
sweeping and radical; it presents reasons to doubt that the criminal law as it is constituted at
present should continue to survive at all. If the criminal law is indeed ‘broken,’ or a ‘lost cause,’
as some commentators allege, no simple fix is possible.”).
81. As noted above, this position also might be consistent with some versions or visions of
criminal law minimalism. See, e.g., sources cited in note 22, supra.
82. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 2 (2007).
83. And, even if abolitionists are primarily focused on distributive consequences, the logic
of abolition would indicate that shifting away from all criminal governance projects is desirable.
See Epps, supra note 76 (“If you champion abolition for certain people and situations but not
others, then yours is not a call for abolition but for sentencing reform. If your strategy to end mass
incarceration is putting more white collar criminals in prison and freeing folks caged only on petty
drug offenses, then you don’t want fewer people in prison, you just want different people in
prison.”).
84. To be clear, for a range of other reasons discussed in this Part and in Part II, even if
those characterizations were correct (in part or whole), that wouldn’t undercut general anticarceral or pro-defendant benefits.
85. Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 262–63
(2007).
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“I am sure that it won’t come as a surprise to you . . . that most of our clients
are not facing regulatory misdemeanors.”86 Yet Patton went on to note the
importance of mens rea and the possibility that these reforms would have
more sweeping effects.87 For example, possessory gun offenses—a category
of crimes often enforced against poor men of color88—often lack clarity when
it comes to mental state requirements.89 Similarly, a range of statutes
criminalizing drug possession in school zones and camping without a license
frequently lack clearly articulated mental state requirements.90
Third and relatedly, even if mens rea reform primarily were to reach
defendants charged with regulatory crimes, it’s not clear what that would
mean from a distributional standpoint. Put differently, the mere
characterization of a crime as “white-collar” or “regulatory” doesn’t mean
that the defendants would be white, wealthy, or stationed atop the social and
economic hierarchy. To the extent that such categorizations of crime are
sweeping, and to the extent that structural biases pervade each stage of the
criminal process, there might be good reason to worry that decisions about
arrest, charging, and sentencing would re-inscribe societal inequalities.91
But even if they didn’t, and even if mens rea reform only were to help
some set of wealthy and powerful defendants, abolitionist opposition to
reform would be misplaced.92 To the extent that abolitionist arguments or an
abolitionist ethic focus on doing away with carceral institutions for everyone,
this should be an easy case. And, even to the extent that some might focus
86. Agency Perspectives: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2014 of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 86 (2014) (statement of David Patton, Executive
Director, Fed. Defs. of N.Y., E. & S. Dists. of N.Y.).
87. See id. at 103.
88. See generally Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173 (2016).
89. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 222 (2010) (“The issues in the present
case do not require the Court to consider any contention that a defendant who uses, carries, or
possesses a firearm must be aware of the weapon’s characteristics.”); Rogers v. United States,
522 U.S. 252, 255 (1998); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994); State v. Ndikum,
815 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. 2012); People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (N.Y. 1987);
Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 892 (2001) (collecting cases); Stephen F. Smith, Proportional
Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 129 (2009) (discussing the interplay of mens rea and gun
possession in Staples); Stephanie Siyi Wu, Note, Unknown Elements: The Mens Rea Question in
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(b)(II)’s Machine Gun Provision, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 407, 408 (2014).
On mens rea in possession cases, see generally Gideon Yaffe, In Defense of Criminal Possession,
10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 441, 453 (2016).
90. See generally Kaitlin Bigger, White Collar Crime Policy, CHAMPION,
September/October 2017, at 47 (collecting sources).
91. See generally Levin, supra note 43 (arguing that the cultural imagination of white-collar
crime and its actual enforcement practices may diverge markedly).
92. To be clear, as stated above, I see this as a different claim from saying that abolitionists
should champion mens rea reform or make it a priority.
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primarily on the extent to which carceral institutions and institutions of social
control harm marginalized communities, there’s no good way to cabin a
carceral turn. Put differently, why should we think that the progressive
arguments against mens rea reform and in favor of pro-prosecutorial practices
in the white-collar realm wouldn’t extend or migrate to other areas and harm
other defendants?93 At the very least, these arguments would prop up the style
of politics and governance that define mass incarceration.94
Finally, one reason that I suggest the frame or arguments advanced in this
Part is that I share a possible concern about the ways in which mens rea
reform (if framed or explained in conventional terms) might also serve a
legitimating function. Abolitionists and other radical critics of the carceral
state often distinguish between “reformist reforms” and reforms that are
“non-reformist” or “transformative.”95 Reforms that fall in the former
category might appear to advance important interests but actually serve to
grow the criminal apparatus and strengthen flawed institutions. In contrast,
reforms that fall in the latter category might be incremental at times but serve
to undermine objectionable interests and institutions.
Mainstream arguments in favor of mens rea reform make the proposals
sound like reformist reforms—the goal is to make sure that the system’s
sorting function works better. In that respect, such arguments resonate with a
universe of calls for reform that focus on “non-violent offenders” and
implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) strengthen the case for harsh
treatment of “violent offenders.”96 Punishing knowing lawbreakers in this
frame is justified; punishing unknowing lawbreakers would be unjust.
But shifting the frame, I argue, allows us to appreciate mens rea reform’s
non-reformist or transformative potential (at least in a limited capacity).
Understanding default mental states as a sort of anti-criminalization rule
93. Cf. Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
321, 321–22 (2002) (“Because punishment is part of a system of institutional authority, it is not
amenable to a simple moral analysis. The legitimacy of punishment is bound up with the
legitimacy of the norm it enforces and of the institutions promulgating the norm, imposing the
punishment, and inflicting it.”).
94. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical
Criminal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3213 (2015) (“Liberal faith in the criminal
apparatus as a solution to the problems of racial and gender subordination may serve to legitimize
our status quo criminal system, strengthen the discourse of individualism that prevents greater
institutional change, and distribute scholarly capital away from emphasizing the structural nature
of racial and gender oppression.”).
95. See, e.g., ANDRÉ GORZ, S TRATEGY FOR LABOR 7 (Martin A. Nicolaus & Victoria Ortiz
trans., 1967); Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Foreword to DAN BERGER, THE S TRUGGLE WITHIN, at vii,
vii–viii (2014).
96. See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 14, at 221–22; MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT 165–69
(2014); cf. Alice Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 566–67
(2018) (critiquing the naturalization of criminal categorizations).
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suggests that they can and should be seen as challenging pro-punitive
defaults. Perhaps more broadly, they could be seen as sending a message that
it should be difficult for the state to criminalize and punish and that it is a
social good to make it even more difficult.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In any discussion of criminal law, it’s inevitable that we must confront the
question of over-inclusivity versus under-inclusivity. That is, try as they
might, legislators, judges, and academics never can or will craft the perfect
rule. On the one hand, criminalize too broadly, and you invite the sorts of
absurd applications discussed at the outset of the Essay, not to mention
inequitable, discriminatory, and disparate enforcement. On the other hand,
criminalize too narrowly, and eventually the Very Bad Defendant will be
acquitted or perhaps not even prosecuted in the first place.
One of the major pathologies of the U.S. criminal system is a seemingly
inescapable cultural fear of under-inclusivity, of the guilty defendant going
free, of the morally culpable person being unpunished, and even the person
released on bail, parole, or probation committing a heinous crime because she
isn’t incarcerated. Public backlash and the resonance of individual bad cases
has led to some of the worst excesses of the criminal system, from threestrikes laws, to sex offender registries, to the normalization of lengthy
sentences and pretrial detention. A recognition of this pathology has driven
so much of the advocacy and scholarship on overcriminalization, not to
mention broader critical accounts of mass incarceration and the nation’s
apparent addiction to punishment.
In this Essay, I have argued that, while mens rea reform is probably less
deserving of enthusiasm, attention, and political capital than it has received
in some corners, it also represents a welcome step away from that fear of
under-inclusiveness. Recognizing that society can’t (and shouldn’t) lock up
everyone who does something bad or causes harm has been, is, and will be a
hard lesson to learn. Perhaps heightened mental state requirements will mean
that more unsympathetic defendants will avoid conviction or that powerful
defendants who have done great harm will be able to deploy a new set of
arguments in their defense. But, to dismantle the carceral state and reverse
the course of mass incarceration, that’s a risk that’s both necessary and well
worth taking.

